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In South Florida, at 5 a.m. on the Monday morning of August 24, 1992, the 164 to 200+ mph 
gusts of Andrew, a Class 4 hurricane (Bair, Elliott and Ruff, 1992) and the first named stonn of 
the 1992 hurricane season, cut a 20 mile wide swath of destruction from the southeast to the 
northwest across southern Florida. The National Weather Service had been tracking and reporting 
the progress of Hurricane Andrew for about a week, and the National Hurricane Center predicted 
the expected time and place of landfall with remarkable accuracy. However, forecasters failed 
to anticipate the stonn' s severe intensity and its rapid speed over land. Prior to the landfall, a 
mass evacuation, especially of those living in areas of potential stonn surge, was ordered by 
officials throughout South Florida. The eye of the stonn moved directly over Homestead, FL and 
the Everglades National Park. Most communities in the path were severely damaged. 
Hurricane Andrew took a relatively low toll of lives but caused immensely high property costs. 
Although rumors regarding migrant workers who might have perished could not be substantiated, 
the number of those who died as a direct result of the stonn was around thirty persons. Damage 
was spread over an area of more than 500 square miles, and the magnitude of the disaster was 
initially difficult to assess. An estimated 100,000 homes were either destroyed or damaged by 
wind and flying debris. There were no communication systems in the affected area. The entire 
infrastructure originally existing in the storm's path ceased to function. Victims were without 
shelter and power and experienced critical shortages of water, food and health supplies. A federal 
disaster was declared almost immediately, but it was state, county and local organizations that 
had to respond to the initial, overwhelming devastation. School openings were postponed until 
September 14 to allow time for evacuees to move out of the schools used as emergency shelters 
and for school roof and structural repairs to be completed. Storm debris hauled to landfills is 
estimated to have been equivalent to the volume generated in 15 normal years of landfill 
operations. Elections were postponed and held September 8. Rough early estimates of the total 
damages from Hurricane Andrew in Florida and Louisiana is $20 billion. However, the figure 
may eventually reach $30 billion. Hurricane Andrew is being considered the most costly natural 
disaster in U.S. history. 
FEDERAL DISASTER RESPONSE POLICIES 
Hurricane Andrew proved that some of the basic assumptions and policies upon which federal 
disaster response is planned are unrealistic. It is assumed that affected jurisdictions will be 
capable of estimation of damages and that federal agencies will provide assistance and resources 
only upon request. Neither Dade County nor the state of Florida was able to provide the needed 
detailed assessment of damages. A Federal Disaster Field Office (DFO) was established in the 
former Eastern Airlines terminal at Miami International Airport on the Thursday of the week of 
the disaster. This DFOserved as the hub for most immediate disaster response activities. Federal, 
state and local agencies and organizations coordinated their activities out of this headquarters. 
The Red Cross and other volunteer agencies mobilized and brought their trained people to the 
disaster area, but they were not able to provide immediate shelter and food needed for nearly a 
quarter of a million people. A week after Andrew struck, tent cities were being set up for the 
victims. Sixteen days into the disaster, 97,000 households were still without water and power, 
and there was still no communication system. Evacuees who were trying to return to their 
neighborhoods found landmarks and street signs destroyed to the extent that they had great 
difficulty locating their devastated or non-existent homes and found no neighborhoods as such 
at all. Eventually, 28,060 military personnel had to be deployed in the disaster zone to support 
the Joint Task Force Andrew humanitarian relief operations. 
ARRIVAL IN MIAMI 
My research assistant, Nancy Winter, and I arrived in Miami on Sunday, September 7. We had 
difficulty finding our hotel which was supposed to be located near the airport. After more than 
an hour of searching and driving, we realized that the reason we could not fmd the place was 
because the hotel's sign was missing; it had been blown off the building. This was a small lesson 
for us in what emergency workers had to deal with when going into the disaster area where there 
were not only missing building signs, but no street signs. 
OUR RESEARCH FOCUS 
Two questions were the focus of our research. 1) How were maps used by emergency personnel 
and by the public during and after Hurricane Andrew? and 2) What kinds of maps were needed 
during and after the disaster? Interviews were conducted with emergency personnel in the 
Andrew Disaster Field Office and with hurricane victims in the communities of Goulds, Perrine 
and Homestead. Results from this research include findings not only from our interviews but also 
from our attendance at a meeting of key officials of the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA) Emergency Support Function of Planning and Information to which we were invited. 
INTERVIEWS WITH THE VICTIMS 
The media, but especially television, provided the only maps the interviewees considered during 
this disaster. Victims interviewed did not employ any maps with which to evacuate. Most of them 
owned no maps to use, nor did they even think about using maps. Those who evacuated went 
to local institutions for shelter or drove to the homes of relatives. Despite the many warnings to 
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evacuate broadcast by the National Weather Service, we found a surprising 50% of the people 
we interviewed in the severely devastated areas did not evacuate during the stonn. Instead, 
victims prayed, or secured the walls of their homes. This percentage is even lower than a New 
York Times/CBS Poll taken in Dade County, Florida on September 12-14 in which 77% of those 
interviewed said they did not evacuate during Hurricane Andrew (The New York Times, 
September 20, 1992). Our interviews revealed that the majority of people found that they had to 
leave after the stonn because of lack of electricity and severe damage to their houses. The pattern 
of whether or not persons evacuated depended upon ownership of property. We found that nearly 
90% of the homeowners we interviewed did not evacuate while in contrast those who rented 
tended to evacuate. All our interviewees declared that they received plenty of warning before they 
made evacuation decisions. The majority received warning infonnation from television; others 
received phone calls from neighbors and friends. All respondents watched the progress of the 
hurricane on television and kept up with weather bulletins issued by the National Weather 
Service. 
Interviews with emergency personnel, who were also victims, and who live in South Florida and 
who experienced Hurricane Andrew revealed that it was a very fast moving hurricane with an 
exceptionally nasty center and surprisingly reduced winds on the back side of the eye. A number 
agreed that "the whole thing was over in 45 minutes" with the winds dropping to 70-80 miles 
after the eye passed and the waves of rain afterwards abating rapidly and gone by noon that day. 
This was unlike other historical Florida hurricanes such as Donna which took a slow, meandering 
12 hours to cross overhead. The extreme devastation to structures from Hurricane Andrew was 
attributed to exceptionally high winds at the eye. They were calculated to have been in excess 
of 200 mph in some specific and restricted areas. 
MAPS A V AILABLE TO EMERGENCY MANAGERS AND PERSONNEL 
We began research at the Disaster Field Office in Miami. When we arrived, map resources were 
scarce, and this lack of maps caused problems. Emergency workers complained about the overall 
lack of available spatial data. Those not familiar with the area were practically lost without 
effective maps to use. In one incident a group was assigned to a particular task within the disaster 
area, but they drove around all day never locating the site. The only map available to them was 
a Florida State Road Map. With most of the highway and exit signs blown away, these maps 
were of limited use, especially because of their lack of detailed infonnation about cities and 
towns. 
Most federal and state agencies had some kind of crude crisis map on their office walls. Many 
of these maps had been brought by individuals who were "map-oriented" or were Rand McNally 
maps supplied at the DFO by Dade County. Pins and colored identifiers were used to show the 
various resource centers that a particular agency or organization was responsible for. These were 
maps that stayed stationary in the office and were used during decision making. 
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Maps Provided by Dade County 
Dade County not only provided all the maps at its disposal, but ordered more. One 20 year 
veteran Dade County official, Assistant Director of the Department of Business and Economic 
Development (DB ED) who lived in the impacted area, acted immediately after Andrew struck 
to order all available State of Florida maps from Rand McNally. The company had nearly 5,000 
copies in stock and immediately available. These maps were distributed to various agencies and 
organizations at the DFO for them; to gain spatial knowledge of the overall disaster area. Most 
agencies and organizations used these maps as basemaps upon which they added their own data, 
making them invaluable crisis maps. Emergency personnel commenting on the Rand McNally 
handouts maps admitted they were not ideal because they did not show enough detail, but they 
pointed out that there were no other maps on hand. Emergency workers supplying aid in the field 
were also given the Rand McNally maps even though they were limited in their effectiveness 
because they did not show enough landmarks nor information for emergency managers unfamiliar 
with the area yet dealing with a lack of street signs. 
Dade County's Office of Computer Services and Information Systems (OCSIS) powered down 
their computers before the storm to help prevent power surges which would affect the computer 
system. The computers are located on the second floor above flood leveL On the third is a 
Geographic Information System (GIS) which served an important function in the early response 
stage of Hurricane Andrew. The initial damage assessment map titled Hurricane Andrew Severe 
Areas South Dade County, Florida, and dated Sept. 2, 1993, was made through the application 
of this GIS and became an indispensable crisis map. Produced by Metro-Dade, the information 
on this map was collected by the local police then added into the county-wide GIS. This map was 
updated as soon as more damage information became available. It was hand colored on the basis 
of the aggregation of police reports. It was the first real damage report developed with any 
systematized reliability. Although in essence subjective, the information came from a usually 
reliable source, the police. Since they couldn't get into all areas because of the blowdown (and 
such impenetrable areas became severity boundaries) and because the police helicopters had been 
in a hanger that collapsed at Tamiami Airport so no police helicopters could be used, the police 
had to make some assumptions in reporting the hurricane damages. Initially, this crisis map 
showed the location of Distribution Centers, DMAT Field Units, Red Cross Service Centers, 
FEMA Disaster Application Centers, Hurricane Shelters, Water Distribution Sites, Tent Areas, 
Burn Sites, Kitchens, and Trash Sites. The same Dade County DBED official who had ordered 
the Rand McNally maps took the initial version of this damage assessment map to a local printer 
to have 3,000 copies made. They were distributed widely to agencies and organizations and were 
found on most of the office walls in the DFO. 
Two other very useful Dade County GIS map products produced in the wake of Hurricane 
Andrew and in great demand after the disaster included a map of all public buildings in south 
Dade County existing before the storm and a detailed road network map. Dade County also 
provided maps already existing in their files including a series of population maps showing ethnic 
distributions. These maps proved to be very useful to emergency managers since the disaster area 
had a wide range of culturally diverse neighborhoods. Dade County landuse maps were also 
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available upon request. 
Map and Photo Sources: County-State Coordination 
The Assistant Director of the DBED also tapped state sources for aerial imagery of the disaster 
area. At the state level, nine tapes of the Florida coast had been shot on August 24, 1992, by the 
South Florida Water Management District. The six helicopters of this Water Management District 
had flown along the coast to fIlm beach erosion, but they had also turned their cameras inland. 
They knew from these photos that the total Hurricane damage was worse than they had originally 
thought. The state had some SPOT satellite images to work with and had a Department of 
Defense trained photo interpreter on their staff. The County DBED official was invited to go to 
the state capital to investigate the state's imagery, but he was too busy at the DFO to take the 
time off. A representative from the Governor's Liaison Office visited the DFO a couple of days 
after the storm. He was making efforts to coordinate the state GIS because he was preparing a 
paper for Congress on the use of GIS on the state level. He made available to the county DBED 
official a damage assessment map produced by the state, but the county had to pay $55 to have 
it sent by express mail. The County DB ED official explained: "They're dealing with different 
problems than we are. Dade County is only 1/67th of their problem. They have a long-term 
orientation; they know a disaster can happen in anyone of the other of Florida's 67 counties." 
Photo Source: County-Federal Coordination 
The Assistant Director of the DBED also made arrangements to secure a set of aerial photographs 
from the federal government. After the storm, he talked to the Dade County Tax Assessor and 
ascertained that the tax department's primary need was post-storm photos and maps in order to 
establish damage assessments and to come up with estimates of the financial impacts. The DBED 
official called the Pentagon and talked to people in the photo division about the possibility of 
receiving some aerials of southern Florida. Two days later he received two sets of photos from 
a company called Continental. However, there was a mixup, he received two of the same sets 
while two copies of another set went to the Corps of Engineers. They discovered what had 
happened two days later and exchanged sets. These photos came at three different scales: 
1 "=800'; 1 "=400' and 1 "=200". In all, the DBED official tried for three days to get photos from 
the federal 'government He learned three things: 1) some photo work had been done; 2) 
intelligence people had done some work to interpret these photos; and 3) it would take days or 
weeks to get permission for him to access the data and materials at an unclassified level from 
intelligence agencies. 
Even though the Dade County DB ED official finally had both the South Florida Water 
Management District images and a set of aerial photos obtained by Army Corp of Engineers' 
overflights after the hurricane, these two sets of photographs could not be used by the County 
for comparative purposes because no photo interpreters were available to make the assessments 
at that point. 
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TECHNOLOGY AND HUMAN RESPONSE 
One of our major findings is the role Geographic Information Systems (GIS) played in producing 
maps for coordination of Hurricane Andrew response and recovery efforts, a historic first. Two 
weeks into the disaster, on Friday before our research team's arrival, Digital Matrix Service, Inc. 
(DMS), a private firm located in Miami, volunteered to set up and staff, without cost for one 
month, their GIS called InFoCad for use in the office dedicated to the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency's (FEMA) Planning and Information Support Function. This private firm 
realized immediately after Andrew struck that their digital database, which had been prepared for 
a client and included every street from Palm Beach to the Keys, would be an invaluable resource 
for FEMA. The firm (DMS) negotiated with the Washington office of FEMA and within 24 
hours the Director of FEMA' s Information and Planning had accepted the offer and arranged to 
have the Army Special Forces transport two workstations, an X-terminal and a pen plotter into 
the Andrew Disaster Field Office. 
In-House Mapping Capability Solves a Communication Gap 
A critical communications problem was the first of many problems solved by the in-house 
mapping capability of DMS. Many victims still stranded by the storm had no communication 
with the outside world. The White House Task Force had arranged to have the Goodyear Blimp 
stationed over the worst hit neighborhoods to furnish messages to victims. These were flashed 
on the blimp in both Spanish and English. The problem was how to find the location of the 
victims. Literally as soon as the DMS computers were plugged in at the DFO, an emergency 
worker requested a map showing the coordinates of all of the neighborhoods in Homestead and 
Florida City. The captain of the blimp used this coordinate map and his on-board global 
positioning system equipment to find the location of the requested neighborhoods and flashed 
information about aid, shelters, field kitchens and hospitals were conveyed to those in need. 
The success of DMS in completing this first custom-made map was the start of a stream of 
ongoing requests for specially prepared crisis maps needed by emergency managers in the DFO. 
The DMS personnel expanded their mapping capability rapidly as the demand for mapping on 
site increased. -
Daily Update of the Database 
Digital Matrix Service, Inc. updated its database- daily as requests for new maps grew. Decision 
making by emergency managers was enhanced by the availability of maps showing the 
distribution of a wide variety of services. Maps showing the distribution of these listed items 
served important functions: 
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Anny Kitchens 
Red Cross Service Centers 
Burn Sites 
FEMA Disaster Application Centers 
Health Centers 
HRS Services 
Map Types Used by Emergency Workers 
Hurricane Shelters 
Medical Facilities 
Tent Shelters 
Trash-Transfer 'Sebns 
Unemployment Centers 
Portable Toilets 
Between September 6 and October 27, Digital Matrix Service, Inc. kept a daily log of the maps 
requested. There were 633 requests for maps. Ninety-nine percent of the map requests were of 
TYPE I data or point data, showing the site locations of a specific data set (see Table 1). 
Table 1 
TYPE I DATA 
· Disaster Application Centers (DAC) · HRS Service Centers 
· American Red Cross Kitchens · American Red Cross Service 
· American Red Cross Warehouses Centers 
· American Red Cross Headquarters · Metro Dade Trash Sites 
· Metro Dade Burn Sites · US Army Tent Shelters 
· Unemployment Claims Offices · US Army Kitchens 
· American Red Cross Hurricane Shelters · Community Health Centers 
· Disasters Medical Assistance Teams 
· IRS Service Centers 
· Trailer Parks 
· Portable Toilets 
· Building and Zoning Damage 
· Contractor Zones 
· Dunn and Brad Street Census Data 
· FIRM Data 
· FPL Siren Buffers 
· Polling Locations 
· Surge Contours 
· Zip Code Zones 
· MERS/MA TIS 
· Emergency Reception 
Centers 
Table 2 
TYPE II DATA 
· Mortalities 
· Damage Assessments 
· Evacuation Zones 
· FPL Siren Locations 
· Hotel Locations 
· Voting Precincts 
· Surge Polygons 
· Hazardous Mitigation 
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Another 38% requested in addition to TYPE I data, TYPE II data or aerial data to be added to 
the categories on the map (see Table II). More complex and time consuming from a production 
perspective were maps that required Type III data; these maps required scanning, rectifying and 
manipulation. However, 11% of the requests were for TYPE III data (Table 3). 
Table 3 
TYPE III DATA 
. Scanned and rectified aerial photography provided by the Army Corp of Engineers 
. Scanned and rectified USGS Topographic Quads 
GIS as an Analytical Tool 
After several days of operation, the value of the Geographic Information System was realized by 
many emergency workers, and requests for analytical maps grew steadily. In one case, GIS 
operators were asked to identify polling places for a rescheduled Primary Election which had 
been postponed because of Andrew. The established database being employed by DMS facilitated 
queries and analysis of the entire land area affected by the -storm. Identification of polling sites 
was not an easy task considering that by law these places had to be a certain distance away from 
any military activity. With over 28,000 military personnel in the area, this became a challenge. 
GIS was successfully employed, and with the fIrst few challenges grew a need for more 
analytical maps. In the end, 63% of the total number of maps produced by DMS required GIS 
applications such as zooming into a land area for a specifIc need or GIS being applied as an 
analytical tool. 
Planning and Information Meeting: What is a GIS? 
The head of the FEMA Planning and Information Emergency Support Function, Jack Bryan, had 
developed an intellectual conviction and a vision that GIS applications can playa critical role in 
information processing during disaster response and recovery. To further enhance information 
flow and to educate those providing the 12 Emergency Support Functions in the Disaster Field 
Office about the immediate effIcacy of GIS applications, he invited the key response agencies 
to a meeting on September 9. The purpose of the meeting was to seek cooperation and 
understanding about the need to coordinate all available existing resources for management of 
the integration of various databases into the GIS being applied daily at the DFO. During the 
meeting it became clear that the majority of key personal had little understanding about what a 
GIS is or what it can do. One of the outcomes of the meeting was that GIS became in the case 
of Hurricane Andrew a key teaching device and a spur to communication between different 
agenCIes. 
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The Problem of Shared Authority Over Data and Resources 
At the September 9 meeting, official representatives from the major response agencies were asked 
. to provide lists of their available data sources that were in digital form. It became obvious that 
the Joint Task Force could provide much of the immediately needed data. The longest discussion 
in the meeting centered on the issue of the need for a central authority to preside and provide 
priorities for the sharing of and integration of data. While the Joint Task Force members were 
willing to provide support and interpreted data, they were reluctant to share any raw data in 
digital form with private agencies. Local and state agencies, on the other hand, shared their 
digital data sources, and many private companies, intent on relieving the suffering of the 
hurricane victims, shared their resources. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The lack of available maps during the response stage of any disaster can delay support for 
victims and needed management responses. An historic and lucky circumstance occurred after 
Hurricane Andrew. Through the involvement of private resources, the need for GIS support in 
mapping for disaster response was highlighted. The work of Digital Matrix Service, Inc. clearly 
demonstrated that by having a GIS-backed mapping capability available, the demand for crisis 
mapping grew rapidly. The issue of the costs of supplying communities or counties in disaster 
prone areas with hard"ware to provide GIS crisis mapping support in an emergency can be put 
in perspective by this report. The Wall Street Journal reported that "the price of a unit of 
processing power on a chip has fallen by half roughly every 18 month ever since the late 1960' s 
invention of the microprocessors, which combine on one piece of silicon groups of circuits that 
can be programmed." Funding for the collection of emergency data on a GIS to aid emergency 
managers during a disaster and the hardware to apply GIS technology to crisis mapping during 
a disaster should be on top of every planning list. 
Evaluation of GIS's and Digital Data • 
Clearly, Geographic Information Systems in their current format pose problems. Still difficult to 
operate unless run by technocrats, GISs need to be made more accessible and easier to operate 
so they can be applied by any intelligent non-specialist. GISs also need to be able to integrate 
different structured data-sources. There is a need to inventory existing GISs in order to identify 
what GIS is most appropriate to be used in an emergency situation when managers are under 
stress and time constraints. Maybe a new system easier to operate needs to be designed. The 
system has to be self-contained. It should be able to run with the use of generators or batteries, 
but still the system needs to be able to handle large datasets. 
Another problem is the collection of data. An inventory of available digital data sources should 
be conducted, and the resulting list should be compiled and published. There is a need for 
standardizing sets. Finally, there is a problem of coordination of. existing data sources between 
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agencies. This might be eased by the establishment of a GIS library service that would provide 
GIS data information and answer questions at all times. This service would be aware of any 
digital data files on the federal and state and local level by regions. 
Guidelines should be written after the evaluation of digital datasets, and their usefulness for 
emergency managing should be evaluated. How often does the data need to be updated? Is the 
scale appropriate? How much detail is needed? These are some of the questions that need to be 
addressed. 
Crisis mapping after Hurricane Andrew illustrated that timely research on perfecting a geographic 
information system for providing mapping during a disaster should be a high priority item in 
emergency management today. 
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